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Challenges to the liberal consensus on governance in the developing world have attracted 
much attention, particularly in recent years under the rubric of concerns about 
“development effectiveness”. This has promoted new interest amongst international donors 
in political economy, as evidenced in research agendas increasingly focused on obstacles to 
change, such as the World Bank’s study of governance reform “under real world 
conditions”; and those focused on levers of change, such as the British Department for 
International Development DFID’s “drivers of change” approach. However, political 
economy insights have proved difficult for donors to operationalise and have yet to feed 
into substantial new departures in donor practice.  
 
Donors’ turn to political economy takes place against the backdrop of broader debates 
surrounding the international agenda for action set by the 2005 Paris Declaration on 
Development Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration asserted the centrality of such terms as 
“ownership” and “partnership” in developmental discourses, and this has been understood 
in sharply divergent ways by political analysts.  Some consider the ownership agenda is too 
apolitical (Hyden, 2008a; Unsworth, 2009; Rosser and Simpson, 2009), while others see it 
as ‘augmenting, and not undermining, established notions of good practice’ (Armon 2007: 
654).  
 
One debate is whether the insertion of concerns for “ownership” and “partnership” into 
donors’ relations with recipient government implies new relations of commitment from 
recipients or control by donors. Supporters of the ownership agenda consider it a matter of 
donors securing recipients’ commitment to the implementation of policies and programs, 
which extends to recipients taking responsibility for implementation (Whitfield and Fraser 
2009a: 3) i. Critics tend to see this instead as donors wanting more control over the agenda 
as a way of limiting policy choices on the part of recipient governments (Whitfield and 
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Fraser 2009a: 3, also Hayman 2009: 594). Thus, for Whitfield and Fraser, who has control 
is more critical than agenda contents and, indeed, how agendas are selected and pursued – 
through democratic, patrimonial or corrupt processes – because they consider ‘the question 
of whether a society can minimise foreign influence over its policymaking is logically and 
politically prior to questions about the quality of internal democracy and about the content 
of policies themselves.’ (Whitfield and Fraser 2009a: 5).  
 
A further development with respect to the ownership/partnership agenda has been the 
emergence of the “new conditionality” critique.  This has spawned a large literature on the 
politics of development practices which principally seeks to variously analyse technical 
processes as a form of coercive “biopower” (Duffield, 2007).  Drawing on the writings of 
Foucault, this literature regards aid practices as comprised of myriad micro-technologies of 
discipline, which aim to reshape recipient agencies in accordance with donor rationalities 
(see, for example, Gould, 2005; Harrisson, 2004; Li, 2007).  Where this succeeds, it is 
argued the result is to effect a depoliticisation of development by virtue of removing the 
bases for resistance within recipient states.   
 
By contrast, our view is that international donors can be in less control of the development 
agenda than these and other authors suggest. Our point is not that donors generally disdain 
control; instead it is that they achieve it rather less often than is supposed as the political 
space for contestation over development agendas (and their implementation) remains rather 
more open than is claimed.  Furthermore, we argue that the space for contestation of donor 
policies depends upon the way that aid money and policies function in the context of the 
local political economy.  In countries where there is high aid dependence, for example, this 
may lead to technocratic elites internalising donor models, as in contexts such as Rwanda 
and Tanzania.  Alternatively, different local political economies of aid may see a variety of 
context-specific strategies of co-optation, negotiation, manipulation and outright resistance.  
In our case studies in Southeast Asia, we found that international donors are less hegemonic 
and intrusive than is often portrayed; and the outcome of their intrusions, regardless of the 
ideology motivating them, is not always necessarily anti-poor and retrogressive, as the 
Foucaultian approach tends to predict ii. Therefore, we accept the premise that donors are 
working from – that political economy issues are critical to aid effectiveness – what we do 
not accept is that the turn has achieved a break with past thinking and practices. We are not 
alone in stating that the donors’ turn to political economy has been inconsequential (see 
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Unsworth 2009); where we make a contribution is in highlighting that the problem lies with 
donors’ conceptions of development as a public good, essentially uncontested and 
objectively known, and opposition as temporary, compensatable and open to 
“partnerships”.  
 
Unsworth rightly indicates the important intellectual and institutional barriers to donors 
acting more politically; however, we reject her view that development happens when the 
right political incentives are created (Unsworth 2009: 889-890; also Williams et al. 2009). 
Instead, we argue political economy analyses need to understand conceptions of 
development or “good governance reform” as ideological constructs emerging from 
struggles between coalitions with different, structurally determined, material interests and 
resources of power. Hence, the analyses of the prospects for particular development 
projects need to proceed by carefully identifying the historically-determined interests, 
distributions of power, and processes by which alliances – not “partnerships” – between key 
groups are formed and maintained. In this way, donors can better know how their programs 
are interpreted by recipients, how this affects their alliances (or not) and, accordingly, how 
formal and informal shifts in alliances can strengthen or weaken different ideological 
perspectives, over short and long terms. 
 
This paper is written in four sections. In the first section we explain the nature of the turn to 
political economy that donors and their consultants are now actively debating. This is 
followed by two sections on the attempts to operationalise political economy analyses, the 
latter directly critiquing three donor documents. Finally, we suggest an alternative 
conceptual typology for repoliticising development; one in which the reform orientations of 
participants are considered centrally.  
 
Capturing donors’ turn 
With greater international donor acknowledgement of the political dimensions of aid 
effectiveness, political economy analyses are being viewed as an important means of 
achieving improvements in development outcomes (see SIDA 2006, World Bank 2009, 
DFID 2009). In this section we outline how this turn is generally explained before 
proceeding with more directed coverage of the conceptions of politics involved. The 
literature we refer to is not limited to the publications of donors themselves, but includes 
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contributions also from a number of institutes and think-tanks with policy and research 
links to bilateral and multilateral donor agencies.  This means there is not only a degree of 
institutional overlap arising from individuals crossing over as consultants and staff, a 
number of the same individuals are also critical observers of the turn, able to reflect back in 
their institutions on what is occurring. As a result, the discussion below serves to cover the 
common themes defining the turn as well some of the more outlying views, not reflected in 
donor documents, but which indicate what is being debated more fully. 
 
International donor’s turn to political economy analysis is most often expressed as the 
desire to identify the “underlying” causes of the outcomes from  their interventions (see 
Dahl-Østergaard et al. 2005: 19, Booth et al. 2005: 2, Cammack and Thompson 2008, 
World Bank 2009). Where attention had been on poor governance, faulty institutions and or 
lack of “political will”, the intention now is to “go beneath the surface” of these to account 
for these. In this, no one framework of analysis is agreed upon and recommended; mostly 
there is some variation on the conceptual mix of “actors, institutions and structures”. A 
second common theme is that donors are wanting to identify not only the obstacles to 
change, but also the positive levers or “drivers of change’ (World Bank 2009: ix, DFID 
2005).  
 
There is rather more critical comment on what this means for donors’ practices, generally 
the need for them ‘to start with the country context, not with a specific policy agenda’ 
(DFID 2003: 11). Criticisms of technocratic approaches to governance reform are a clear 
influence here; both with respect to the “straight to Weber” concern to replicate 
international best practice and the focus on formal institutions, resulting in too little 
attention to the informal processes that can explain how political actors actually behave and 
how political systems really work (Hyden 2008b, Unsworth 2006). Whilst for some, this 
suggests a need for interventions to be adapted to local/country circumstances, for others it 
suggests more – that the local should be a source of policy and programming initiatives. For 
example, to quote Hyden: 
To date, donor agencies have acted as if the glass is half empty. The challenge has 
been to fill the void with ideas and practices that have worked elsewhere. What if 
the glass is viewed as half full and the challenge is to fill it by improving practices 
already on the ground in Africa? (Hyden 2008b: 1-2) 
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However, starting with the country context is not the same as a political approach as it can 
suggest adaption to the status quo. Booth and his colleagues are more concerted advocates 
of donors as behaving as brokers of change. Their starting point is there are often 
discernable opportunities for reformers  ‘to use strategies and tactics’ to shape development 
outcomes (Buse and Booth 2008: 3, Booth et al. 2006). From this they conclude donors 
need to allow greater space for ‘adaptive’ learning and be much more flexible and 
responsive in their planning and financing of projects and programs (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2009: 25). In short, what these researchers have more in mind is that development is 
a political process, albeit one they view as negotiable.  
 
Going a step further, it is signalled that politics is not something to be avoided; as the 
essence of development is that donors have to ‘deal with it’ (Booth et al. 2006: 1, Unsworth 
2009: 887). As Grindle put it before, it is necessary to ‘accept politics, not as a spanner in 
the economic works, but as the central means through which societies seek to resolve 
conflict over issues of distribution and values’ (Grindle 1991: 45). Thus, Edelmann talks of 
using ‘positive language’ (Edelmann 2009: 74)  with respect to political factors. By this he 
means, instead of thinking that politics is always in the way of things, there is a need to 
acknowledge the legitimacy and rationalities of political behaviours in their own terms.  
 
We can see then that the literature on donors’ turn to political economy offers plenty of 
pointers to the implications for development practice. However, despite the urging to do 
more with political economy analyses, politics continues to be conceived of in largely 
stunted and instrumental terms. In the next section we indicate this in reviewing the various 
attempts to operationalise political economy. Overwhelmingly, either political economy 
insights are used to adapt to the status quo – and essentially avoid politics – or, 
alternatively, they are viewed into “factors” in the current tool bag of donor interventions 
(Booth et al. 2006, Chhotray and Hulme 2009: 45).  
 
Operationalising political economy  
Broadly it is accepted that international donors have found it particularly difficult to 
operationalise political economy; to translate research insights into actionable strategies 
(Warrener 2004, Dahl-Østergaard et al. 2005: 23-25, Scott 2007: 89, de Haan and Everest-
Phillips 2007, Bird 2008, Unsworth 2009, Chhotray and Hulme 2009: 45). As Unsworth 
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makes clear, donors’ approaches have remained largely technocratic and ‘there is little 
evidence that it is prompting them to question their (mostly implicit) assumptions about 
how development happens’ (Unsworth 2009: 884).  
 
First, political economy analyses are said to enable international donors to trim their 
ambitions for reform to better align them with what is “feasible” and “realistic” in different 
contexts (World Bank 2009: 12-13, DFID 2009: 150-17). As Unsworth (2009: 887) 
observes, ‘a common experience is that political analysis can prompt country programme 
managers to adjust their expectations, review overall priorities, and make changes in project 
design and aid modalities’ (Unsworth 2009: 887). The trimming can apply to goals, 
timeframes and expectations of a clear result (Booth et al. 2006: 60, Dahl-Østergaard et al. 
2005, de Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007: 12). Political economy analyses are considered to 
equip international donors with the knowledge to better understand the risks of failure they 
face and to cut their cloth accordingly. In this light, the donors are in fact aiming to avoid 
political engagement by sticking to working within the status quo.  
 
Alternatively, political economy analyses are operationalised as a way to equip donors to 
identify leaders or “champions” to be the drivers of change. Williams et al. describe these 
as individuals within political and bureaucratic elites who are ‘motivated by considerations 
of the greater public good’ to ‘play a pivotal role in promoting change’(Williams et al. 
2009: 28). However, they warn such individuals are not necessarily powerful; they may be 
committed but ineffective. Also, they may ‘often have multiple agendas and issues’ and so 
‘their needs, incentives, and constraints’ need to be fully understood (World Bank 2009: 
47). The focus on elites is significant: de Ver (2008: 49) includes leaders from business and 
civil society, but her attention to “coalitions” is still limited to the interactions among them 
and not between them and the marginalized poor, for example. 
 
More than any other, there is a view that political economy insights can be operationalised 
by efforts directed at changing resource and or political incentive structures (Landell-Mills 
et al. 2007, Booth 2008, Unsworth 2009, Chhotray and Hulme 2009: 41, Williams et al. 
2009). Incentives are in this respect the “carrot” alternative to the “stick” of conditionality: 
both are considered to encourage desired behaviours. Whereas “champions” are essentially 
already made, here the intention is to create and shape new reformers.  This can be allied 
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with the concern to identify the winners and losers from change, to ensure that the losers are 
sufficiently compensated to avert their resistance (Meier 1993: 387).  
 
However, despite there being wide acceptance of the role of incentives as drivers of change, 
there is little actual analysis ‘of how incentives and political processes operate in practice’ 
(Landell-Mills et al. 2007: 5, also de Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007: 10). Williams et al. 
(2007) are critical of attempts to use only financial leverage, arguing for longer term 
institutional changes to support actor behaviour; yet they do not abandon incentives, all 
they do is source them differently, in institutional frameworks. From our perspective, it is 
likely that the incentives international donors can offer are one or more among many that 
the targeted recipients face. Moreover, donor programs are often designed to link with – 
and promote – the very capitalist development processes that can provide other, “perverse” 
incentives not to participate or comply (by, for example, providing alternative revenue 
sources). It is one thing to examine the political economy of particular, “intentional” 
(planned) development processes; it is another to consider the political economy of related, 
“immanent” (structural) processes, and how these intersect with the planned interventions 
(see Cowen and Shenton 1996: 4). 
 
The thinking on incentives is linked to the ‘principal-agent problem’ in rational choice 
theory (see Nunberg et al. 2010). This is ‘the problem of motivating one party to act on 
behalf of another’ (World Bank 2009: 51): the issue being how to get one actor (the agent) 
to behave in ways that satisfy the preferences of another (the principal, the donor). 
Critically, because individuals are assumed to act according to their rational calculations of 
the best way to enhance their utility, they are thought to be best motivated to change by 
personal inducements. Linking incentives to utility maximisation does not enable 
understandings of the political process in terms of inequalities of power and ideology 
(Whitfield and Fraser 2009b: 36, Grindle 1991).   
 
Alternatively, political economy analyses are said to enable better communication 
strategies. DFID reports that political economy analyses have improved ‘the quality of 
dialogue and engagement with partners’ (DFID 2009: 18). Communication strategies are to 
be directed at reformers, opponents and the public in general to facilitate “voice”, 
deliberative dialogue and coalition building (Odugbemi and Jacobson 2008). In World 
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Bank terms, information campaigns and intensified dialogue with key stakeholders can be 
drivers of change in that they ‘deepen the understanding of reform issues and/or to win 
support’ (World Bank 2009: 20). Otherwise, the World Bank also refers to the need for 
‘information and communication campaigns’ (World Bank 2009: 21) in which international 
donors act as “honest brokers”. There is similar talk in relation to coalition building – 
wherein donors work to develop linkages between different pro-reform individuals and or 
groups to aggregate, support and embolden the drivers of change. For example, Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi speak of ‘another kind of facilitation, namely the brokering or negotiation 
of difficult change processes, turning potential realignments of interest into actual 
realignments’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: 21); there are ‘conditions in which an 
intelligent third party can expect to play a useful role, as an enabler of constructive 
realignments’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: 21) between different actors. Both the 
communication and honest broker approaches stress the contingencies in political 
alignments, but again with rather less attention being paid to the inequalities of power and 
ideology.   
 
Finally, there are attempts to operationalise political economy insights through donors 
acting to ‘build demand’ for change among citizens (AusAID 2007, Haley 2008). This is 
generally conceptualised as working ‘outside the state to build progressive change 
coalitions across civil society, the private sector and the media’ (DFID 2009: 6). Recently, 
AusAID has acknowledged that its own responses to the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action have focused on ‘ownership’ and ‘harmonisation’ (AusAID 2009: 1-2) 
with partner governments and not with in-country non-state actors. Accordingly, the agency 
is now working to see how ‘engaging with civil society can help extend “ownership” 
beyond central government’ (AusAID 2009: 1-2).  In this way, political incentives are 
operationalised in ways that recast the principals as citizens who can (or ought to) wield the 
weapon of accountability to demand good development from their agent politicians (who 
want to be re-elected) (World Bank 2009). 
 
Compared to the trim ambition response above, this is clearly a more proactive and indeed 
apparently political response from donors. However, a question is what demands are to be 
supported? Are we observing donors attempting to build new, previously untapped support 
for their own (struggling) programs, or are they looking to support (more concertedly than 
in the past) the “organic” demands of existing social movements? The gap between these 
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need not always be great, still it is useful to compare the “build demand” response to 
solidarity actions. Solidarity means engaging with the movements of poor and marginalised 
people because it is the authenticity of their demands, not the technical correctness of their 
solutions that makes them authoritative. An important point is that solidarity entails taking 
sides in historical conflicts that are as well often deeply ideological. By contrast, to what 
extent does the “build demand” response require that civil society organisations, for 
example, trim their own reform ambitions to comply with donors’ expectations for the 
resultant social order? The power relationships in these two are very different. Currently, 
most official development “partnerships” with civil society organisations are directed at the 
effective implementation of the donor’s program. 
 
Critiquing the turn 
In this section we elaborate on what is missing from the political economy turn of 
international donors. In bringing politics back into development, the donors have not 
radically transformed their notion of development, but have emptied the concept of 
politics of its meaning and resonance.  This is achieved through the retention in donor 
discourse of the idea that development ‘is a public good’ (Hyden 2008b: 3). The precise 
nature of this public good is affected by context to be sure, but it is objectively 
identifiable as operating in the public interest all the same.  This conception of 
development is antithetical to an understanding of development itself as political.  Hyden 
(notes, international donors have ‘tended to take authority, consensus and the pursuit of 
collective goals as givens. … [They have] acted on the premise that there is a “negotiated 
order” between equal partners’. He adds, ‘The alternative [view] that collective goals may 
be the negotiated outcome of conflicts between parties holding different degrees of power 
is never considered’ (Hyden 2008a: 262-63). 
 
Evidence for this conception of politics can be found across a range of donor documents.  
Here we focus on three: Building Demand for Better Governance: New Directions for the 
Australian Aid Program (2007), Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy 
Analysis: Good Practice Framework (2009), and The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens 
and States: Findings from Ten Years of DFID Funded Research on Governance and 
Fragile States 2001-2010 (2010). Although these documents are clearly not representative 
as a sample, they were selected following a wider review of numerous documents produced 
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by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. The first two, produced by the World Bank and 
AusAID, exemplify three broader patterns identified in donor approaches to political 
economy: namely, a reassertion of development as a public good, objectively identifiable; a 
consequent view of opposition as temporary and compensatable rather than structurally and 
ideologically determined; and the use of a variety of framing strategies to avoid awkward 
realities that threaten this view.  Such strategies include: emphasis on the “local” at the 
expense of the national; emphasis on service-delivery rather than, for example, 
redistribution of resources; an understanding of “structural factors” as primarily concerned 
with geographical realities and resource endowments rather than as related to issues of 
economy or class; and concentration on citizens as clients of public services rather than as 
contenders for control over state institutions and resources.  These emphases shore up a 
conception of development as essentially technical and uncontested, allowing an embrace 
of politics as a bargaining process rather than as a struggle aimed at reforming entrenched 
structures of power.   
 
In the World Bank’s formulation, two recurring concepts suggest the assertion of 
development as a public good.  The first concept is that of ‘progress’ (World Bank 2009: 
10): the utility of political economy analysis is that it allows analysis of situations ’where 
political economy factors appear to prevent progress that is otherwise considered possible 
from a technical perspective’ (World Bank 2009: 10). The unquestioned assumption that 
the World Bank policies equate to progress, objectively measured from ‘a technical 
perspective’ is maintained despite awareness that opposition may emerge from ‘underlying 
drivers such as the relationship between stakeholders, available rents and how they are 
distributed, interests, collective action dilemmas and incentives’ (World Bank 2009: 9-10). 
The Bank acknowledges that there may be opposition to reform: ’many of the reforms ... 
involve changes to power relations, rent-seeking approaches or to ingrained incentive 
structures’ (World Bank 2009: 11). Yet these are never problematised in terms of the 
assertion of “progress”: the Bank’s framework proceeds from the assumption that the 
Bank’s account of “good governance” is unquestionably for the good of all over the long 
term.  This has an impact on the way that the Bank conceives of opposition itself.  
Opposition cannot be regarded as serious or legitimate, even though it may be 
understandable in cases where particular groups bear an unfair proportion of the costs of 
development.  Yet this is regarded as either temporary or compensatable, given the overall 
dividends from “development”.  The idea that development may attack the material 
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interests of certain classes in society in order to benefit others is never taken seriously. 
Opposition is reduced to coordination problems associated with the difficulties of transition, 
rather than structurally and ideologically determined conflict. Consequently, structural 
analysis in World Bank documents is never fully elaborated: where it occurs it focuses 
mainly on geographical issues such as distributions of natural resource endowment.  There 
is no concern to unpick structural inequalities of dominance and subordination within 
society, or to analyse how these might be entrenched or attacked by development processes.   
 
For AusAID (2007 and 2009), equally, the emphasis on development as, ultimately, good 
for everyone has led to antagonism towards “oppositional” groups.  AusAID uses the 
concept of “partnership” to frame a different sort of politics, associated with the building 
and coordinating of networks of governance rather than with struggle between dominant 
and subordinate groups. AusAID defines partnerships as ‘strategies that increase links 
between local communities, local government and civil society in the planning, delivery 
and performance assessment of local services, or plans to meet other local development 
challenges’ (AusAID 2007: 7). This range of strategies can be used, it is asserted, ’to 
develop collaborative rather than oppositional relationships with government on various 
issues’ (AusAID 2007: 7). Indeed, partnerships are intended to be based upon ’mutual 
respect, transparency, shared planning and decision-making, co-ordination and support’ 
(AusAID 2007: 5). Rather than constituting a process which is essentially contested and 
contentious, producing new relations of domination and subordination, development is now 
regarded as largely uncontroversial and “of mutual benefit”.  The possibility of structurally 
disadvantaged groups existing in persistent relations of subordination vis-à-vis elite actors – 
whether state, non-state, or community elites – is precluded.  Instead, opposition is 
reframed as the pursuit of self-interest at the expense of the public interest – hence the 
inordinate focus on patrimonialism as a form of rule that is antithetical to this.  Opposition, 
even in the classical liberal form of assertive scrutiny of the state and rights based resistance 
to expansions of state power, can therefore be largely dispensed with.   
 
AusAID’s model of partnership runs the risk of imposing forms of collaboration that 
disguise and marginalise conflict, rather than allowing it political expression.  Indeed, 
AusAID makes the ability to ‘have a respected and credible voice’ contingent upon the 
ability to engage in approved forms of partnerships, rather than taking a ‘blunt oppositional 
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approach’ (AusAID 2007: 2).  This narrows the scope of acceptable forms of opposition to 
well within the rather broad limits envisaged by classical liberalism. It further raises the 
prospect of replacing liberal institutions with new forms of network governance which, via 
partnership relationships backed by donor funds, expand the reach of the state far more 
widely than before. For donors, admitting the legitimacy of opposition entails undermining 
the authority of technocratic development models.  One strategy for ameliorating this 
problem is to narrow the scope of development, and this has been achieved by two means.  
First, the fashion for decentralisation has prompted a narrowing of the spatial horizons of 
development. Second, a shifting of the focus of “development” from economic growth to 
provision of services allows a narrowing of the conception of the state-society relationship.  
The assumption is that the major mode of engagement between citizens and governments is 
as consumers of services.  That citizens should be empowered to assess the performance of 
those services, is central to the new public management model associated with the 
neoliberalisation of states in the West from the early 1980s.  This is significant, since 
drawing upon the neoliberal, market-based model of community relations in fact obviates 
the need for the kinds of structural analysis that “demand for good governance” approaches 
initially posited.  Once the citizen has been tacitly recast as a consumer of services, 
“empowerment” becomes oriented around mechanisms for complaint or consultation about 
a restricted list of government activities (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007).  While the 
stranglehold of pernicious, “rent-seeking” and “patrimonial” elites remains to be tackled, 
there is little else on the liberal horizon for politics to deal with, except the day to day 
brokering of minor conflicts. 
 
Combining these two trends and pitching development as a process of service delivery 
which occurs at the “local” level within “communities” makes it easier to assert that it is 
also consensual.  Reliance upon the “community” and the local level has the effect of 
reducing the scope of politics to the level of the “village” while framing out larger scale, 
specifically structural processes of transformation.  Of course village politics can be and 
often is contentious and stratified; however, it is also often very well policed and poorly 
networked internationally, so that practices of opposition or processes of exclusion are less 
overtly contentious.  Looking specifically at service delivery also reduces the extent to 
which even intra-village politics interferes with the assumption of fundamental consensus.  
At the village level, most services – e.g. health, education, access to justice, use of the vote 
(AusAID, 2007: 4) – are externally provided goods;  their quality and scope are rarely the 
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subject of intra-village contestation unlike, say, regimes of land ownership and resource 
control.   
 
These discursive strategies allow the assertion of a “political” approach to development 
which in fact leaves almost entirely intact a regime in which donor priorities are imposed 
onto recipient communities and governments in a manner highly reminiscent of 
conditionality. Use of the term “ownership” does little to disguise this: although it features 
heavily in contemporary aid discourse, it is rarely used without ambivalence. For AusAID, 
a key concern of governance programs is ‘building the demand’ for good governance 
(AusAID 2007: 3, emphasis added), suggesting that intervention is required to orient 
community action to priorities identified by donors.  Elsewhere, however, the document 
specifies that local priorities ‘may not match donor-identified priorities’ and that ‘[l]essons 
from past experience highlight that when external actors identify these issues, they risk not 
only lack of local interest and ownership, but also legitimacy’ (AusAID 2007: 4). The 
World Bank shares the same ambivalence towards ownership as the AusAID document.  
Thus, the Bank comments: ’Because feasible solutions are sensitive to the political 
economy context, they should in principle be more compatible with country ownership a 
key principle of the development effectiveness agenda’ (World Bank 2009: 12).  Yet, as 
with the AusAID document, the preoccupation is with ‘building support‘ (World Bank 
2009: 15) for pre-existing World Bank agendas, and much discussion is devoted to the 
utility of the analysis for decisions and options for “the team” and for the “reputational risk” 
of the Bank (see World Bank 2009: 10). 
 
The DFID document, The Politics of Poverty, goes much further towards reinvesting the 
politics of development with ideas about structurally produced inequality and collective 
struggle. In synthesizing ten years of research, DFID reports: ‘Research has shown that 
political context and process is central to shaping the way politicians and policy makers 
decide for or against progressive changes that can deliver legitimate, capable, accountable 
and responsive states’ (DFID 2010: 5). The assertion of “progress” is associated with ‘the 
role of contestation and bargaining between the state, elites and citizens in building the 
public institutions that deliver development’ (DFID 2010: 5).  It is important to note that 
contestation and bargaining remain associated with means, rather than with ends.  
“Development” remains to be “delivered” rather than constructed through political action. 
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However, in the report, a key concern with “the political settlement” allows attention to 
structural inequalities embedded in political institutions that maintain the dominance of 
elites at the expense of subordinate groups. 
 
Consequently, DFID’s agenda for rethinking development allows much more emphasis on 
struggles for power among unequal contenders than either AusAID or the World Bank is 
prepared to admit. DFID acknowledges the need to promote “active citizenship” whereby 
citizens develop as actors, capable of claiming rights and acting for themselves’ (DFID 
2010: 52). Furthermore, the development of citizens as actors is regarded as requiring the 
forging of “broad coalitions” which promote changes through ‘contention and contestation 
– both inherent in how they are framed and in how they are fought’ (DFID 2010: 55).  In 
regarding contentious coalitions as drivers of change, DFID explicitly challenges 
‘approaches to participation and civic engagement, which reduce such processes to 
technical solutions, or to notions of and processes of “national ownership”, achieved 
through non-contentious consultation and dialogue – but which veil vast chasms of 
differences in power and interest’ (DFID 2010: 55).  DFID regards the mere provision of 
state-sponsored space for participation as insufficient to challenge such inequalities: the 
mobilization of ‘broad-based coalitions’ on their own terms is required (DFID 2010: 64), 
and this should apply to ex ante contention over policy as well as ex-post contention over 
the quality of services delivered (DFID 2010). This leads DFID to an understanding of 
development which requires collective action to challenge dominant power relations. 
 
In this vein, DFID rejects AusAID’s appeal to the “local community” as a means of 
avoiding contentious politics. Indeed, the DFID report specifically asserts that decentralised 
institutions are ‘no more likely, in and of [themselves] to be more accountable’ (DFID 
2010: 47) noting that local politics is just as elitist as national politics, and that 
decentralization can be used to shore up national level inequalities, rather than to undermine 
them. 
 
However, even in DFID’s relatively radical formulations we see certain restrictions 
imposed. First, DFID persists in viewing collective struggles as something that need to be 
understood in order for donors to achieve their goals in promoting change.  For example, 
the report notes with respect to fostering coalitions for change that ‘strengthening 
organisations that are on the margins of the network and have few relations to the state is 
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likely to have limited impact.  On the other hand, strengthening those central to the network 
and well-connected to the state is likely to produce far greater impact’. DFID concludes 
from this ‘the need for some caution, especially on the part of external organisations, about 
their ability to engineer quick institutional fixes’ (DFID 2010: 70).  While the caveat is 
well-made, it is only relevant if collective action is seen as an instrument for “institutional 
fixing” rather than as an end in itself, in terms of challenging power relations in society. 
 
Similarly, in its concluding chapter, DFID notes that outsiders have far less influence over 
local development processes than is often assumed’ (DFID 2010: 92); yet again, this 
statement is delivered as a warning rather than as the starting point for rethinking the 
purpose and nature of “development”. 
 
Furthermore, throughout the report, key terms such as “exclusion/inclusion,” “mobilisation” 
and “legitimacy” are substituted for a careful analysis of different types of coalition or 
collective action.  The report claims that ‘capacity to mobilise supporters’ is essential for 
effective rule, and that this capacity flows from ‘social legitimacy’ (DFID 2010: 17).  
However, in this section of the report, legitimacy and mobilisation are seen as a function of 
institutional design rather than as a function of distributions of power achieved through 
struggles between elites and masses.  This, arguably, glosses over the particular dynamics 
of political action.  Although later in its report, DFID flags the need for broad-based 
coalitions to undertake collective action, these are regarded in terms of securing policy 
change rather than as fundamental to the political settlement itself.  As such, the opportunity 
to connect the achievement of policies with the redistribution of power in society is lost: the 
latter is discussed almost solely in respect of founding moments in post-conflict states, 
while the former is related to questions of service delivery, losing the opportunity to regard 
development, even outside fragile and post-conflict situations, as a process of open-ended 
struggle and contestation.   
 
The language of exclusion, inclusion and marginalisation opens up the prospect of 
discussing inequalities in distributions of power and access to resources, and making this 
fundamental to conceptions of development.  Here, too, DFID goes far further than either 
the World Bank or AusAID in acknowledging persistent structural inequalities between 
groups. However, DFID limits its discussion of these largely to issues of ethnicity and 
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gender. Thus particular and salutary attention is paid to the need to remove structural 
obstacles to the empowerment and participation of women, indigenous groups, ethnic 
minorities, dalits and so on (see for example, DFID 2010. 17; . 34; . 44). Far less attention is 
paid to a broader understanding of class-based structures of domination, which would make 
the politics of struggle a far more central and challenging problem for donors.  As it is, 
these elisions allow a conception of the politics of development which requires a 
redistribution of power at the margins, to be sure; but in the interests of legitimising elite 
settlements at the centre. 
 
Taking the repoliticisation of development entails reconceptualising politics as a struggle 
between coalitions, not merely at the margins, but at the centre; and allowing conceptions of 
development to be articulated as an outcome of this form of contention.  Political economy 
analysis thus needs to understand conceptions of development or “good governance reform” 
as ideological constructs emerging from struggles between coalitions with different, and 
structurally determined, material interests and resources of power.  We employ the term 
“alliances” rather than “partnerships” as a means of emphasising the contingent nature of 
political coalitions, and their formation as an effect of the interplay of structurally determined 
interests, distributions of resources, and contending ideological positions. Analysis of these 
allows development outcomes to be thought through, not merely as the extent of adherence to 
or “ownership” of liberal norms, but as part of an ongoing process of struggle for control 
over the distribution of power and resources in society. For donors, this has the added value 
of giving emphasis to the nature of contending groups and their processes of formation; the 
stability or otherwise of alliances over time; and the ideological underpinnings of conceptions 
of “development” that are being contested. 
 
From this perspective it makes sense to distinguish between, not only the constituencies that 
are “for” or “against” a particular project, but between the long term and short term interests 
of different groups more broadly.  Short term interests may or may not broadly align with 
project aims; long-term interests are more concerned with an overall perception on the part of 
interested actors regarding ways in which strategies for maintaining domination or 
contending for power will be affected in the broader sweep of change associated with neo-
liberalisation, globalisation and donor intervention. Understanding long term ideological 
imperatives can inform a political debate between donors and recipients that goes deeper than 
the sterile language of ownership and incentivisation. 
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Toward a Typology  
As a starting point for such analysis, we suggest a research agenda for political economists 
working in development contexts which begin by elaborating questions of how ideas of 
reform emerge from struggles between and within alliances of reformers and opponents. The 
alliances forged around reform, we contend, are not “partnerships” but the stuff of politics 
itself. As such, reformers themselves, in relation to a particular reform agenda, can be 
categorised into idealists; pragmatists; and opportunists (see Table One below).  Importantly, 
reformers (and opponents) may or may not have official responsibility for the reform’s 
implementation. Rather than look to who has official, institutional responsibility and seek 
their commitment or “ownership”, we suggest that a broader determination of reformers and 
opponents provides greater clarity about the interests and power relations involved and, also, 
about the nature of pro and anti-reform alliances and how they might be understood and 
maintained or countered. Alliances can be disaggregated into two subcategories: tactical 
alliances, based upon conceptions of short term instrumental gain; and dedicated alliances 
based upon ideological convergence around particular conceptions of reform (see Table 
Three below). Similarly, alliances against reform can be disaggregated into different types of 
opposition. We identify three categories: wreckers, who directly oppose reform as antithetical 
to short and long term interests; obstructers, who may be uninvolved in the short term in the 
particular reform, but whose interests and position, over the long term, form part of the 
overarching structures that idealists seek to transform; and recalcitrants, whose interests are 
tangential to the reform process, and whose passivity is a drag on reform efforts. Short term 
tactical or long term dedicated alliances may form between these different subcategories in 
order to oppose reform efforts. 
 
A further category of actors is also significant in analysis of reform prospects – namely 
gatekeepers (see Table Two below).  These are actors who hold power over the issue area 
and can facilitate or block reform action. This group is worth specific attention because, 
regardless of other interests that might come into play, maintenance of the gate keeping role 
is likely to form one of their key concerns. The role of gatekeepers is significant in 
considering how an interest in maintaining or altering long term distributions of power over 
policy processes is a key determinant of ideological convictions in particular policy areas. 
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Reformers  
(in relation to a 
particular reform 
agenda)  
Idealists:  interested in reform in so far 
as it advances long term goals of social 
transformation.  
Form dedicated alliances only with 
ideologically likeminded actors; likely 
to reject tactical alliances. 
Pragmatists:  have long term goals of 
social transformation but also consider 
short term gains significant. 
Form both dedicated and tactical 
alliances 
Opportunists:  have short term goals of 
self-interest; long term goals unrelated 
to reform agenda. Hence commitment 
is contingent and tactical. 
Form tactical alliances. 
Table One.  Types of Reformers 
 
In addition, other key actors are as follows: 
Gatekeepers Hold power over the issue area and 
therefore need to be onside in some 
way.   
Short term and long term goals may 
coincide with reformers in some 
respect, or not; but maintenance of 
gate keeping position is likely to be 
one of their objectives. May be drawn 
into tactical alliance, but the power 
they hold entails that they can 
withdraw at any time with little cost to 
themselves. 
Opponents Recalcitrants: oppose reform because 
they see no advantage in supporting it.  
Interests tangential but their 
cooperation is in some way necessary 
if their recalcitrance is an issue. 
Wreckers: oppose reform because they 
regard it as operating directly against 
their interests. 
Interests are directly affected, and they 
will attempt to form tactical alliances 
(e.g. with recalcitrants) or dedicated 
alliances in opposition. 
Obstructers Not directly involved in the reform 
process, but their interests and 
activities form part of the broader 
structures that make reform difficult. 
Interests and goals are wider than the 
specific reform programme, and form 
part of the overarching structures that 
idealists seek to transform. 
Table Two.  Other Key Actors 
 
A further step in constructing a typology for analysing the relationship between actors, 
distributions of power, and ideological approaches to reform, is to consider the power 
relations operating within alliances constructed around reform agendas.  Co-operative 
alliances emerge among groups with broadly even distributions of power among themselves.  
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As such, changes in perceptions of interest or divergence in goals are likely to more swiftly 
result in a breakdown in the alliance. Controlling alliances emerge among groups with 
unequal distributions of power among themselves (see Table Four below). Consequently, 
they may more easily maintain outward shows of stability even when under stress; but 
divergences in interest or breakdowns in common perceptions may cause the emergence of 
subversion from within. As asserted by a number of political economy analyses, the degree 
of formality of these alliances may be highly varied, from contractual or written agreements 
to loose groupings of support. 
 
Having disaggregated reformers, we disaggregated their alliances further. These alliances 
are cooperative: 
 Formal Informal 
Dedicated NGO or political party coalitions; long 
term programme funding relationships 
Networks 
Tactical Some kinds of short-term coalitions; 
project agreements 
Ad hoc movements; political deals 
involving accommodation and 
compromise 
Table Three.  Cooperative Alliances 
 
These alliances are controlling: 
 Formal Informal 
Dedicated Co-optation (e.g. membership of an 
advisory board, encouraging the member to 
shift allegiances or modify aspirations over 
the long term) 
Clientelism (e.g. promise of inclusion 
over the long term in a flow of benefits 
or informal rewards) 
Tactical Contractualism (e.g. one group is formally 
employed by another to achieve a 
particular purpose or legal or contractual 
obligations are brought into play to achieve 
compliance) 
Coercion (pressure and/or inducements 
brought to bear to ensure compliance 
over the short term) 
Table Four.  Controlling Alliances 
 
A crucial aspect of this kind of analysis is that it draws attention to shifts in distributions of 
power among and within alliances, and the effect of this on the ideological framing of reform 
agendas. As such, this typology is capable of sustaining a more nuanced analysis of fluid and 
contested situations than models based upon incentivisation of rational preference-pursuing 
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actors; or models based upon pragmatic replication of good-enough solutions. Analysis of the 
relationships between class structure, power, and ideology in the context of alliances of 
reform allows for richer appreciation of the way that strategies of contention are both 
constrained by context and continually evolving. As such, this approach allows a more truly 
political analysis of the ways in which reform coalitions emerge and subside, and, finally, a 
properly political analysis of the support role that donors can play in that process. 
 
Conclusion 
The political economy analyses that have become prominent in donor thinking over the last 
decade reflect, in our view, an astute, recognition of the centrality of politics to the   
conceptualisation of development and reform. However, donors have been unwilling to 
import an adequate conception of politics itself into their analysis, resulting in political 
economy approaches that have failed to offer new ways of understanding aid programming. 
In particular, there has been insufficient recognition that contention over development means 
and ends represents more than transitory conflict over temporary or compensatable costs and 
benefits attached to the mechanics of change. We argue for a richer conception of politics as 
comprising entrenched struggles between groups emerging as a result of structurally 
determined inequalities in the distribution of power and resources within society.  
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